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INTRODUCTION

I.

The legal profession has long promulgated rules in an effort to guide

attorneys toward appropriate ethical behavior. I By formulating such rules
and by enforcing them through professional discipline, the profession has
undertaken the admirable task of policing its own members. 2 The past

decade has seen a proliferation of different standards for attorney conduct, 3 in part because of common law developments in the areas of legal
malpractice and ineffective assistance of counsel. 4 In addition, the bar has
contributed to the proliferation of conduct rules by establishing standing

committees that have promulgated advisory ethical standards in certain
specialized fields. 5 Despite the increasing number of rules, however,
their situation-oriented 6 character has resulted in omissions and inconsis-

tencies which leave attorneys without guidance in many situations.
More importantly, the proliferation of ethical conduct rules has served
to emphasize a long-standing problem inherent in those rules: They embody two essentially contradictory views of the lawyer's role-the "law-

yer as an officer of the court" and the "lawyer as a zealous representative
of the client"-but fail to articulate a basis for deciding which view
1. The current American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter cited
as ABA CODE], for example, was preceded by the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in
1908 and amended numerous times between 1928 and 1951. The original ABA Canons had been
based primarily on the Alabama Bar Association's Code of Ethics, adopted in 1887; that Alabama
code, in turn, had been inspired by the lectures of Judge George Sharswood and by David Hoffman's
essay on professional deportment. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23-26 (1953). See generally 2 D. HoFF.
MAN, A COURSEOF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed. Baltimore 1830) (1st ed. Baltimore 1817); G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (4th ed. Philadelphia 1876) (1st ed. Philadelphia 1854).
2. Whether the legal profession is meeting that admirable goal is another matter. See. e.g.. ABA
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,

PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN

(Final Draft, 1970) (Clark Committee Report). Except to the extent that
its operation is impeded by the rules themselves, professional discipline is not considered in this comment.
3. In this comment, "conduct" will be defined as "the behavior of lawyers" which "assumes
both community and professional standards." Marks & Cathcart, DisciplineWithin the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 196. Marks and Cathcart's statement, however.
that "agreement about norms [for conduct] exists, whether they be criminal laws or professional ethics" is not here endorsed. Id. Indeed, this comment details the professional disagreement about the
appropriate ethical conduct for a criminal defense attorney whose client is committing perjury.
4. See Part III-A-4 infra (summary of recent developments in the common law ineffective
assistance of counsel doctrine).
5. Through a special standing committee, for example, the ABA has promulgated criminal jusDISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT I

tice standards for the prosecution and defense functions. E.g., ABA PROJECT ONSTANDARDS FORCRIMI.
NAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, THEDEFENSE

FUNCTION (Approved Draft, 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS]. See Part llI-A-3

infra (discussion of ABA Defense Standards relating to perjury of a criminal defendant).
6. See notes 7-13 and accompanying text infra (definition of the situation-oriented model of professional responsibility).
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should govern his conduct in specific situations. Through an examination
of the professional conduct rules that govern the controversial situation of
a criminal defense attorney whose client intends to commit or is committing perjury, this comment analyzes the failure of those rules to guide attorney conduct and presents an alternative approach to their formulation.
II.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SITUATION-ORIENTED
AND SYSTEM-ORIENTED RULES FOR PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT

A situation-oriented model of professional responsibility treats each
factual situation as unique. 7 Under this approach, "[i]nstitutional rulemakers'' 8 balance the competing policies that support different possible
rules and then formulate a rule or standard of conduct for a particular set
of facts. 9 In addition to the difficulty of the rulemakers' task in deciding
what factors should be considered and what weight should be given to
each, 10 the situation-oriented model results in a lack of coherence between the discrete rules formulated." Further, situation-oriented rules
provide attorneys with minimal guidance in those factual situations not
anticipated by the rules 12 and, because of their discrete nature, do not al3
low easy extrapolation to unique sets of facts.'
The various ethical rules that govern attorney conduct have been characterized as "situation-oriented"1 4 and exhibit the ambiguity typical of
such rules.' 5 The American Bar Association Code of Professional Re7. Aronson, ProfessionalResponsibility: Education and Enforcement, 51 WASH. L. REV. 273,
287 (1976). "The essence of this model is that each situation in which an ethical question is presented
is unique.... A uniform goal orientation is subordinated to reaching the 'right' result in each case."
Id.
8. Powers, Formalismand Nonformalism in Choice ofLaw Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REv. 27,
31 n.22 (1976). Examples of rulemaking bodies in the area of professional responsibility are the
American Bar Association committees that drafted the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Standards Relating to the Defense Function. See, e.g., notes 51, 82 & 89 infra.
9. Aronson, supra note 7, at 288.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 319. Compare ABA CODE, DR 7-102(A)(7), reproduced in note 75 infra, and ABA
DEsFE S'mjDms, supra note 5, § 3.7(b), at 15 with id. § 7.7, at 17, 167, reproduced in note 89
infra.
12. For example, ABA Defense Standard § 7.7, reproduced in note 89 infra, did not specifically anticipate the situation in which a case is tried to the court without a jury. See, e.g., note
131 infra.
13. "The mapping problem occurs because rules do not always translate... perfectly the policies which generated them into results in individual cases." Powers, supra note 8, at 30-31. In the
case of rules for conduct of a criminal defense attorney confronted with client perjury, an additional
problem is created because the policies that generated the rules are contradictory. See notes 23-33
and accompanying text infra.
14. Aronson, supra note 7, at 287.
15. Id. at 284 ("As a section of a criminal code, [the ABA Code] would be stricken because

213

Washington Law Review

Vol. 55:211, 1979

sponsibility (ABA Code),' 6 supposedly the authoritative source of
standards for attorney conduct, has been roundly criticized for its lack of
guidance,1 7 especially in difficult cases, 1 8 and for its lack of discrimination between the various capacities that attorneys may serve in the legal
system. 19 Although the ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function
(ABA Defense Standards) 20 have been applauded as a more specific set of
guidelines for defense attorneys, 2' they have also been criticized for their
22
choice of certain ethical ideals over others.
A major reason for the inadequacy of current situation-oriented ethical
rules is that they embody two incompatible views of the lawyer's role:
the "lawyer as an officer of the court" and the "lawyer as a zealous
representative of the client." ' 23 The "lawyer as an officer of the court"
view is based on the premise that the trial process is the optimum truthfinding device. 24 Accordingly, the lawyer's role is to aid in ensuring in'men

of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning'...."). See Sutton, How Vulnerable Is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 497, 508 (1979). See also
Marks & Cathcart, supra note 3, at 229 ("A vague rule is like no rule at all.").
16. See Part III-A-2 infra (discussion of ABA Code provisions relating to client perjury).
17. E.g., Aronson, supra note 7, at 274 ("a series of ambiguous and only tangentially related
rules which are often contradictory or misleading"); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 737 (1977) ("The lawyers' interest is in maximum flexibility;
the more latitude lawyers have, the less bother the Code is for them .... Taken separately or together, these sections [of the ABA Code] allow an attorney maximum flexibility to justify almost any
course which he or she has chosen."); ANNUAL CHIEF JUsTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ONADVOCACY
INTHEUNITEDSTATES, ETHICS ANDADVOCACY, Commentary to Recommendation C, at 12 (Final Report,
1978) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL WARREN CONFERENCE]. See also Freedman, ProfessionalResponsi-

bility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1484
(1966) ("[lI]t is precisely when one tries to act on abstract ethical advice that the practicalities intrude.
often rendering unethical the well-intended act.") (footnote omitted). See generally Comment, ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility: Void for Vagueness?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 671 (1979).
18. E.g., Aronson, supranote 7, at 289 ("A system [such as the ABA Code] purporting to affect
self-discipline which exerts little or no influence in difficult cases is inadequate."); Sutton, supra
note 15, at 514 ("Paradoxically, the Code is at once too complex and too simplistic .... [Mlost
difficulties encountered in the use of the Code are attributible [sic) to provisions that all too often
create a false sense of simplicity by ignoring complicating factors.").
19.

E.g., ANNUAL WARREN CONFERENCE, supra note 17, Recommendation B, at 10.

20. See Part III-A-3 infra (discussion of ABA Defense Standards relating to client perjury).
21. E.g., Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 CIN. L. REV. I, 33 (1973). See
Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 437 n. 14 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976) (The
content of ABA Defense Standard § 7.7 "is eminently sound" and the ABA Defense Standards "collectively . . . have made an extraordinary contribution to the criminal justice process.").
22. Bazelon, supra note 21, at 33.
23. E.g., United States ex rel.Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977)
("[D]efense counsel in a criminal case assumes a dual role as a 'zealous advocate' and as an 'officer
of the court'...."); Dike v. Dike, 75 Wn. 2d 1, 5-6, 448 P.2d 490, 493 (1968) ("[Aln attorney
has a dual role-he is both an advocate for his client and an officer of the court.... Neither duty can
be meaningfully considered independent from the other.").
24. The competing views of professional responsibility have been characterized as "'truth-oriented" and "adversary-oriented." The "lawyer as an officer of the court" view exemplifies the
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formed judicial decisions. 25 Under this truth-oriented view, for example,
a prosecutor is required to disclose evidence tending to negate or mitigate
27
the defendant's guilt 26 and to seek "justice" rather than conviction.
The second major view-the "lawyer as a zealous representative of the
client' '-is supported by the principle that the clash of adversaries contributes to sound judicial decisionmaking and requires each side to present its best possible case. 28 Within this adversary-oriented view, special
protections, such as the attorney-client privilege, 29 are provided to ensure
truth-oriented model. Aronson, supra note 7, at 295. Within this characterization, the "equal adversaries alternative" and the "innocence-oriented alternative" are subsets of the "adversary-oriented"
view. Id. at 295-318.
25. Representative of this view is the Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, in which a trial is seen as an attempt to obtain an impartial judgment, and the lawyer's role is
to assist in promoting a "wise and informed decision." ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958). In this view of the trial process,
[t]o permit a client who will commit perjury to take the stand does not contribute to a wise and
informed decision. It is difficult to differentiate among forging documents, suborning another
witness, and calling one's own client with the knowledge that he will lie. An impartial, informed, and wise decision presupposes that the person deciding a case has been given the truth.
To furnish him with a lie is to mock impartiality, to mislead rather than to inform, and to stultify
the decisional process rather than to make it an exploration leading to mature judgment.
Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 1485, 1488
(1966). Accord, Bress, Standards of Conduct of the Prosecution and Defense Function: An
Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 Ami. CRIM. L.Q. 23, 24-25 (1966) ("All lawyers must remember that the
basic purpose of the trial is the determination of truth."); Drinker, Some Remarks on Mr. Curtis'
"The Ethics of Advocacy," 4 STAN. L. REv. 349, 350 (1952) ("Of course no one could say that an
occasion might not possibly arise when there was no alternative except the truth or a lie and when the
consequences of the truth were such that the lawyer might be tempted to lie. This, however, would
not make it right for him to do so."); Frankel, The Search for Truth:An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1031, 1057-58 (1975) (proposed redrafting of ABA Code, DR 7-102 to increase instances
of disclosure of client's making of untrue statements); Morgan, supra note 17, at 738 (protection of
confidences and secrets under the ABA Code "must be balanced against the perversion of justice a
lawyer can justify in the name of the 'client's' privilege."). See also ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra
note 5, Introduction, at 142 ("It has even been suggested, but universally rejected by the legal profession, that a lawyer may be excused for acquiescing in the use of known perjured testimony on the
[N]o honorable
transparently spurious thesis that the principle of confidentiality requires this ....
lawyer would accept this notion .... [T]he mere advocacy of such fraud demeans the profession and
tends to drag it to the level of gangsters and their 'mouthpiece' lawyers in the public eye.").
26. ABA CODE, DR 7-103(B).
27. Id. EC 7-13.
28. This view is the "equal adversaries alternative," Aronson, supra note 7, at 303, within the
"adversary-oriented model" of professional responsibility, id. at 300. See note 24 supra. The equal
adversaries view anticipates that the rules for prosecutors' and defense counsel's conduct will be
identical.
29. The attorney-client privilege, which renders inadmissible otherwise valid testimony and permits the withholding of certain evidence from the court, has been justified on the following bases:
The relationship between attorney and client approaches a "sacred trust," e.g., United States v. Costen, 38 F. 24, 24 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889); it is necessary in the "interest and administration of justice,"
e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); it encourages freedom of consultation between
attorney and client, e.g., Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 1960), which is necessary for
full development of the facts and adequate representation, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
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the maintenance of confidentiality in lawyer-client communications. 30 In
addition, the criminal defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty,
and the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3' Consequently, the role of defense counsel is defined differently
than that of the prosecutor: 32 A defense attorney, for example, need
33
present no evidence even if she knows the truth.
While any given situation-oriented rule embodies one of these two
views of a lawyer's role to a greater or lesser degree, the application of
these views to specific situations is unsystematic. Consequently, rules of
ethical conduct as a whole are not guided by a single, unifying principle
that could provide coherence and direction in situations not covered by
the specific rules. Although the two competing views of the attorney's
role both reflect valid ideals for a system of ethical rules, their continued
coexistence within the situation-oriented model serves only to perpetuate
professional confusion and permits attorneys to justify virtually any
course of conduct as ethical.
One commentator has suggested that, to be workable, professional
rules must be "system-oriented" or "define the lawyer's role in terms of
391, 403 (1976); and, absent the privilege and the prohibition of attorney disclosure of client confidences, the client would be subject to an indirect form of self-incrimination, Noonan, supra note 25.
at 1485. Also, it has been suggested that client confidences must be maintained in order to avoid
greater mischiefs, e.g., Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 833 (1956), including the possibility that an opposing party might prevail in a lawsuit merely by
calling the client's attorney to testify against her, Noonan, supra, at 1485.
The application of the privilege may result in shielding the client's guilt, although that is not its
purpose. E.g., Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960). In this respect, the attorneyclient privilege and the exclusionary rule in criminal procedure function similarly: On the basis of
overriding policy considerations, otherwise truthful evidence is kept from the fact-finder. See
Freedman, supra note 17, at 1482. See also note 43 infra.
30. See Parts III-A-I and III-A-2 infra. The common law attorney-client privilege and the provisions of Canon 4 of the ABA Code both serve to protect the confidentiality of the attorney-client
relationship and are in many respects duplicative. But see notes 57-58 and accompanying text infra.
31. E.g., Freedman, supra note 17, at 1471. Other special protections are also afforded to the
criminal defendant in the trial process. See, e.g., Noonan, supra note 25, at 1490. These protections
represent the "innocence-oriented alternative" within the adversary-oriented model, Aronson, supra
note 7, at 314, which anticipates different rules of conduct for prosecutor and criminal defense counsel. See notes 24 & 28 supra.
32. E.g., ABA CODE, EC 7-13 (special ethical duties required for prosecutors).
33. [D]efense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth. Our system assigns him a different mission. . . .Defense counsel need present nothing, even if he
knows what the truth is. ...Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put
the State to its proof, to put the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he
thinks or knows to be the truth.... In this respect, as part of our modified adversary system and
as part of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require
conduct which in many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted). See ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, Commentary to § 1.1, at 177.
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the legal system's overall goals." 34 Under this model of professional responsibility, the primary duty of the lawyer "would be to serve those
goals to the best of his or her ability regardless of personal ethics." 35 The
system-oriented model could avoid the problems inherent in the traditional, situation-oriented model of professional responsibility by defining
the specific guiding principle that the attorney should follow in cases not
36
otherwise governed by discrete rules.
Instituting a system-oriented model would require, however, that "the
Bar achieve consensus as to the overall goal of each subpart of our system
of justice.'' 37 Since the current situation-oriented rules have emanated
from an attempt to acknowledge two competing views of the attorney's
role, 38 achieving such a consensual goal would be difficult. But if the
purpose of a code of conduct is to provide uniformity and to control conduct, the legal profession can no longer afford the luxury of avoiding the
choice between these two views of the attorney's role.
The choice between these views need not, however, be absolute in order to be worthwhile. Attorneys serve in many different capacities in the
legal system, including those of criminal defense lawyer and prosecutor.
Each different capacity may indeed merit a different guiding principle.
The situation of a criminal defense attorney whose client is committing or
intending to commit perjury on the witness stand, analyzed below, may
warrant adversary-oriented ethical rules that allow him to represent his
client with zeal and without constraint. The situation of the prosecutor, on
the other hand, might require innocence-oriented 39 rules that would prohibit his use of false evidence to secure a conviction. The choices to be
made by the professional rulemakers, while difficult, are essential if the
34. Aronson, supra note 7, at 293-94 (emphasis added). A system-oriented model would avoid
"mapping" problems. See note 13 supra (discussion of "mapping").
35. Aronson, supra note 7, at 293-94.
36. In a system-oriented model, if no specific rule mandated particular conduct in a given situation, the attorney would determine the appropriate ethical conduct by looking to the guiding principle
underlying the rules. Id. at 294-95 n.54. A system-oriented model would be more likely to have the
advantages of a "formal" decision, which "uses less than all available relevant information by following a rule which screens from the decisionmaker's consideration all information not specifically
invoked by the rule." Powers, supra note 8, at 28. Formal rules are advantageous because they: (1)
are predictable, (2) are easier to apply, (3) shift responsibility from decisionmakers to rulemakers, (4)
transmit rulemakers' values to decisionmakers who might not be trusted, and (5) contribute to the
possibility that like decisions will be made alike. Id. at 29-30.
37. Aronson, supra note 7, at 294. The coexistence for centuries in the Anglo-American legal
system of the roles of "lawyer as an officer of the court" and "lawyer as a zealous representative of
the client" illustrates the difficulty of instituting a system-oriented model. See notes 23-33 and accompanying text supra.
38. The formulation of any situation-oriented rules to guide attorney conduct is merely an effort
to balance the several values inherent in the adversary system. See Aronson, supra note 7, at319.
39. See notes 24 & 31 supra.
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ethical rules are to serve their purpose. The situation of the criminal
defense attorney whose client commits perjury demonstrates the necessity
of such choices.
III.

A SITUATION-ORIENTED EXAMPLE: THE CRIMINAL
DEFENSE ATTORNEY WHOSE CLIENT COMMITS OR
INTENDS TO COMMIT PERJURY

The conduct of defense counsel in criminal cases is governed by diverse and frequently contradictory rules. Criminal defense lawyers, like
all lawyers, are guided in their conduct by statutes, common law, and
ethical rules. In addition, criminal defense lawyers are controlled in part
by the procedural protections afforded to their clients, including the developing doctrine of the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. All of these sources of conduct rules may bear on an attorney in a
given situation-for example, a criminal defense attorney is required to
conduct himself ethically, as measured against applicable ethical rules,
and competently, as measured against ineffective assistance of counsel
standards. The appropriate ethical conduct for a criminal defense attorney
in any situation is therefore difficult to determine. 40 In no area are the
rules of ethical conduct more confusing or controversial than when a
criminal defendant intends to commit or commits perjury on the witness
41
stand.
The situation of the criminal lawyer whose client is presenting perjured
testimony brings into bold relief the contradictory norms and values inherent within the various rules, and makes especially clear the conflict
between the rights of a criminal defendant and the professional responsibilities of her attorney. Even more importantly, the situation reflects the
40. The criminal defense attorney is often confronted with conflicting and overlapping duties:
If the lawyer is faced with a close ethical question and resolves it in favor of his client, he quite
often still feels that somehow he has violated a duty owed to the court or profession. This most
often occurs where the lawyer feels bound to non-disclosure by reason of the attorney-client
privilege but bothered by disclosure as possibly demanded in the duty of candor and fairness to
the court and profession.
Comment, Fruits of the Attorney-Client Privilege:IncriminatingEvidence and Conflicting Duties, 3
DUQ. L. REv. 239, 239 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Fruitsof the Attorney-Client Privilege]. The criminal defense attorney is particularly likely to confront these conflicting duties because of a general
professional duty to provide representation for those accused of crime, including those known to be
guilty. E.g., Freedman, supra note 17, at 1469.
41. See, e.g., Callan & David, ProfessionalResponsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality:Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 391-93 (1976);
Lefstein, The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinking the Defense Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 666 (1978). See, e.g., notes 89-97 and accompanying text infra(discussion of one controversial rule that governed attorney conduct in the face of client perjury).
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larger problems-of ambiguity, incompleteness, and a general failure to
guide-engendered by a situation-oriented approach to professional responsibility.
A brief examination of the controlling situation-oriented rules is
necessary to an understanding of the ethical dilemmas which they fail to
resolve.
A.

TraditionalRules for Defense Counsel's Conduct

1.

The common law attorney-clientprivilege and the future crime
exception

The attorney-client privilege 42 protects communications made in confidence by the client to her lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. 43 Like other common law testimonial privileges, it is intended to
foster a relationship that would be harmed by compelled disclosure of
confidential communications. 44 Underlying the privilege is the assump42. The common law attorney-client privilege is of ancient origin, e.g., Prichard v. United
States, 181 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir.), affdper curiam, 339 U.S. 974 (1950), and is one of a limited
number of exceptions to the general rule that the public has a right to every person's evidence, e.g.,
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). The privileged nature of a given communication is
a matter of law, not ethics, and is judicially determined. E.g., Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d
855,864 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). See also Part III-A-2 infra (discussion of the
more broadly defined ethical duty to maintain client confidences and secrets).
43. The general principle of the attorney-client privilege has been stated by Wigmore:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the
legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev.1961) (emphasis omitted). The attorneyclient privilege is justified on the basis of policy considerations, however, and may sometimes give
way to competing policies. E.g., Magida ex rel. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12
F.R.D. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (expanded pretrial discovery as competing policy). See also note 29
supra (discussion of policy considerations supporting attorney-client privilege).
Although it is "merely declaratory of the common law," State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn. 2d 799,815,
259 P.2d 845, 854 (1953), the attorney-client privilege in Washington is statutorily defined. R.C.W.
§ 5.60.060(2) provides that "lain attorney or counselor shall not, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of professional employment." WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.060(2) (1978). Also, "the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney" are protected. WASH. Civ. R.
SuaP. Cr. 26(b)(3). Under Criminal Rule 4.7(f)(1), "legal research or ... records, correspondence,
reports or memoranda to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories or conclusions of investigating or prosecuting agencies" are protected. WASH. CRIM. R. SuPER. CT. 4.7(0(1). The exceptions
to the attorney-client privilege have been defined in Washington by the courts. E.g., Dike v. Dike, 75
Wn. 2d 1, 14, 448 P.2d 490, 498 (1968) (whereabouts of client who violated child custody order not
privileged).
44. 8 J. WMoRE, supra note 43, § 2285.
Wigmore has outlined four conditions necessary for the existence of any privileged communication:

219

Washington Law Review

Vol. 55:211, 1979

tion that, in its absence, clients might be less than fully candid with their
attorneys and consequently fail to obtain the full benefits of legal assis45
tance.
The law of the attorney-client privilege is, however, as much defined
by its exceptions as by its affirmative protections. 46 The future crime exception allows disclosure of confidential communications made by a
client who seeks legal advice to further a criminal plan47 or who reveals
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance
of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must
be greaterthan the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
Id. at 527 (emphasis in original). Wigmore has observed that only the fourth condition is open to
dispute under a claim of the attomey-client privilege. Id. at 528.
45. 8 J. WIGMoE, supranote 43, § 2291. See State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wn. 2d 828,832,
394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964); Hartness v. Brown, 21 Wash. 655,668, 59 P. 491, 495 (1899). See also
United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977) ("When an attorney
unnecessarily discloses the confidences of his client, he creates a chilling effect which inhibits the
mutual trust and independence necessary to effective representation."). As Wigmore noted, "the
privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose. Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete ....
It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy,
but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth." 8 J. WGMORE, supra. § 2291, at
554.
46. All exceptions to the attomey-client privilege are based on the notion of client waiver, either
actual or constructive. Consequently, the privilege is personal to the client, e.g., Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956), and cannot be
waived by her attorney, e.g., Magida ex rel. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co.. 12
F.R.D. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
47. E.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied. 401
U.S. 974 (1971); State v. Richards, 97 Wash. 587, 592, 167 P. 47, 49 (1917). Justice Cardozo's
language is often invoked to describe the exception:
There is a privilege protecting communications between attorney and client. The privilege takes
flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in
the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told.
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (dictum). Accord, 8 J. WIGtORE, supra note 43, §
2298, at 573 ("[The] reasons [for the privilege] all cease to operate . . . where the desired advice
refers not to prior wrongdoing, but to future wrongdoing.") (emphasis omitted).
The rationale behind the future.crime exception to the attorney-client privilege was articulated in a
leading English case:
In order that the rule [of privilege] may apply there must be both professional confidence and
professional employment, but if the client has a criminal object in view in his communications
with his solicitor one of these elements must necessarily be absent. The client must either conspire with his solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is avowed the client does not consult his adviser professionally, because it cannot be the solicitor's business to further any criminal object. If the client does not avow his object, he reposes no confidence, for the state of facts.
which is the foundation of the supposed confidence, does not exist. The solicitor's advice is
obtained by a fraud.
The Queen v. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. 153, 168 (1884), quoted in State v. Phelps, 24 Or. App. 329, 545
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an intention to commit a crime from which the attorney is unable to dissuade him. 48 Thus, the exception applies to client communications of intent to testify falsely. 49 Before the attorney-client privilege will fall under
the future crime exception, a prima facie showing of intent to commit a
crime must be made by evidence extrinsic to the attorney-client relation50
ship.
2.

The ABA Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
The ABA Code, 5 1 adopted in some form by forty-nine states, 52 pro-

P.2d 901, 904 (1976).
The exception to the attorney-client privilege extends as well to "continuing" crimes. E.g., Dike
v. Dike, 75 Wn. 2d 1, 14, 448 P.2d 490, 498 (1968).
48. E.g., United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939); In
re Sawyer, 229 F.2d 805, 808-09 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956).
49. E.g., State v. Phelps, 24 Or. App. 329, 545 P.2d 901, 904-05 (1976) (client's communication to attorney that he could present false witnesses not privileged). The rationale behind the exception is that a client cannot
employ an attorney for the purpose of aiding and abetting him in the commission of a future
crime or fraud, and thereby seal the lips of his lawyer to secrecy and thus prevent the exposure or
detection of such crime or fraud. The privileged communication may be a shield of defense as to
crimes already committed, but it cannot be used as a sword or weapon of offense to enable
persons to carry out contemplated crimes against society. The law does not make a law office a
nest of vipers in which to hatch out frauds and perjuries.
Gebhardt v. United Rys. of St. Louis, 220 S.W. 677, 679 (Mo. 1920).
50. E.g., United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939). See
8 J. WIOMORE, supra note 43, § 2299. A mere assertion by the attorney that the client intends to
commit a crime or fraud is not sufficient to destroy the privilege. United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d at
40.
51. The ABA Code was the product of five years' work by the Special Committee on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards. It was adopted by the ABA's House of Delegates in 1969, became effective on
January 1, 1970, Preface to ABA CODE at i, and has been amended seven times since its adoption, id.
at ii; ABA CODE, DR 2-102(C) app. Since late 1977, an ABA Commission on the Evaluation of
Professional Standards, headed by Robert Kutak, has been rewriting the Code of Professional Responsibility in response to its critics within and without the profession. Say Revised Ethics Code Will
Be 'Enforceable,' 65 A.B.A.J. 1283, 1283 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Revised Code 'Enforceable'].
The Kutak Commission is scheduled to release a discussion draft of the revised code at the February
1980 ABA meeting, id., and to submit a final draft to the ABA in August 1980, Commission Bites
Bullet on Ethics Code Issues, 65 A.B.A.J. 887, 888 (1979). The House of Delegates is expected to
consider the final draft at the February 1981 ABA meeting. Id.
The current ABA Code is comprised of nine canons, which are "statements of axiomatic norms,
expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their
relationships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession." Preliminary
Statement to ABA CODE at 1. The Code also includes 138 ethical considerations, which "are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should
strive," and 41 disciplinary rules, which "are mandatory in character.... [and] state the minimum
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id.
The ABA Code has, however, been criticized for not conforming to its own plan for distinguishing
between canons, disciplinary rules, and ethical considerations. Sutton, supra note 15, at 508, 516.
52. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
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vides rules for attorney conduct in a variety of professional situations.
The ABA Code's utility as a source of definitive standards for lawyer
conduct, however, is seriously impeded by its inconsistencies and omissions. 53 In particular, the Code embodies both views of the lawyer's professional role discussed above, 54 but provides no method for resolving
55
these contradictory roles when an attorney is faced with client perjury.
Canon 456 of the ABA Code mandates the preservation of client confidences and "secrets" 57 by the attorney. Since it includes secrets within
its scope, Canon 4 is broader than the common law attorney-client
privilege. 58 The disciplinary rules of Canon 4 generally prohibit knowing
revelation of a client's confidences or secrets 59 and prohibit their use to
the disadvantage of the client. 60 Under Canon 4, therefore, an attorney

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE BY STATE].
The 49 states include those which adopted the ABA Code in its entirety without amendments, those
which later amended it, and those which adopted amended versions. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE LAWYER 221-25 app. (N. Galston ed. 1977). The standards are compulsory in some states and

advisory in others. ABA CODE BY STATE, supra, at 1.The ABA Code has not been adopted by California, but even there it is considered authoritative in many respects. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 809, 823 n.50 (1977).

The Washington Supreme Court adopted its Code of Professional Responsibility on December 7.
197 1, to be effective on January 1, 1972, WASHINGTON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [herein-

after cited as WASH. CODE], and has amended it twice since adoption, with the majority of amendments relating to lawyer advertising, see 91 Wn. 2d 1102-16 (1978); 88 Wn.2d 1110 (1977); 80
Wn. 2d 1119-81 (1971). See also notes 76-77 infra (discussion of one major substantive difference,
relating to client perjury, between the ABA and Washington versions of the Code).
53. See notes 7-19 and accompanying text supra (discussion of problems with the ABA Code
generally).
54. See notes 23-33 and accompanying text supra (discussion of these two views).
55. The ABA Code applies to all attorneys and generally fails to discriminate between different
ethical problems presented in civil and criminal representation. See, e.g., ANNUAL WARREN CONFERENcE, supra note 17, Commentary to Recommendation B, at 10. See Part Ill-B infra (analysis ofthe

alternative courses of conduct available to the criminal defense attorney confronted with client perjury and of the ethical problems with each).
56. "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." ABA CODE, CANON4.
57. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A) defines "[clonfidence" as "information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law" and "secret" as "other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client." Id. DR4-101(A).
58. Id. EC 4-4. See ABA COMM. ONPROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975), discussedin
note 79 infra.
59. ABA CODE, DR 4-101(B)(1). The attorney may, however, reveal client confidences and secrets in limited circumstances. Id. DR 4-101(C). See notes 63-68 and accompanying text infra (discussion of the future crime exception to the ethical duty to maintain confidences and secrets).
The Washington version of DR 4-101(B) was amended at the time of adoption to specify that
client confidences and secrets cannot be disclosed during or after termination of the professional relationship. WASH. CODE, supra note 52, DR 4-101(B). This amendment merely reflects a rule
contained elsewhere in the ABA Code. See ABA CODE, EC 4-6.
60.
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may not reveal a client's admission to past criminal acts 6' nor her knowl62
edge that the client has committed perjury.
The ethical duty to maintain client confidences and secrets contains a
future crime exception, 63 as does the attorney-client privilege. 64 Under
DR 4-101(C)(3), a lawyer may reveal a client's criminal intent and the
information necessary to prevent the crime. 65 An ABA ethical advisory
opinion 66 goes further, and requires an attorney to disclose such information to the court whenever facts within his knowlege indicate beyond a
reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed by his client. 67 Also, the
Code allows an attorney to request permission to withdraw from representation when a client "[p]ersonally seeks to pursue an illegal course of
conduct.' '68
Canon 769 of the ABA Code advises the attorney to represent his client
with zeal but within the bounds of the law. 70 The lawyer is reminded that,
61. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICs, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1318 (1975) (past perjury in
related proceeding in another jurisdiction and in course of representation by another attorney is confidential). See also C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 95, at 200 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972); 8 J. WtMoRE, supra note 43, § 2292.
62. See, e.g., ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1416 (1978) (planby
clients in civil case to obtain verdict by fraud, when subverted through attorney's discovery and remonstration, is privileged); id. No. 1318 (1975) (client's admission to attorney that he committed perjury in a related matter in another jurisdiction is protected as confidential); id. No. 1314 (1975) (when
attorney finds in course of criminal trial that his client has already committed perjury, his primary
duty is to protect the confidentiality of that privileged communication).
63. ABA CODE, DR 4-101(C)(3), reproduced in note 65 infra.
64. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
65. Specifically, DR 4-I01(C)(3) provides that "[a] lawyer may reveal... [t]he intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." ABA CODE, DR
4-101(C)(3) (footnotes omitted). See also id. EC 7-5 ("A lawyer should never encourage or aid his
client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on how to violate the law and avoid punishment
therefor.").
66. ABA advisory opinions, promulgated by the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility to interpret and clarify the ABA Code, are persuasive but not mandatory authority. As
with the Code itself, the state courts having jurisdiction over lawyer discipline are free to endorse or
to refuse to endorse the advisory opinions. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS,
No. 1420 (1978). See also H. DRINKER, supra note I, at 32.
67. ABA COMM. ON PROFE.SSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 314 (1965).
68. ABA CODE, DR 2-1 10(C)(l)(b). DR 2-I 10(C)(l)(b) provides that "[i]f [the preceding provisions for mandatory withdrawal are] not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw
in matters pending before a tribunal, and may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or
such withdrawal is because . . . [hlis client . . . [p]ersonally seeks to pursue an illegal course of
conduct." Id.
69. "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law." Id. CANON
7.
70. The ethical considerations supporting Canon 7 encourage the attorney to avoid arguments to
the trier of fact of personal opinion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, id. EC 7-24, to avoid
out-of-court statements that may improperly affect the impartiality of the tribunal, id. EC 7-33, and
to resolve doubts as to the bounds of the law in favor of his client when serving as an advocate, id. EC
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except for decisions not affecting the merits of a case or substantially
prejudicing the rights of a client, "the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law,
such decisions are binding on his lawyer.' '71 Of special relevance to client perjury is the admonition that an attorney who knowingly participates
in the introduction of false, fraudulent, or perjured testimony or evidence
72
is subject to professional discipline.
The disciplinary rules of Canon 7 expressly prohibit an attorney from
knowingly using perjured testimony or false evidence, 73 from participating in the creation or preservation of evidence known to be or obviously
false, 74 or from counseling or assisting client conduct known to be
fraudulent or illegal. 75 One specific rule, embodied in an amended DR
7-102(B)(1),76 provides that an attorney with information clearly establishing client fraud on a person or tribunal shall request her client to rectify the fraud; if the client refuses, the attorney must reveal it to the affected person or tribunal. The rule does not provide as much guidance as
might first appear, however, because revelation is not required when the
information is privileged. 77 Further, despite its strong wording, the rule
7-3. An "advocate" is defined as an attorney dealing with past acts and an "adviser" as an attorney
dealing with future acts of the client. Id. A lawyer acting in the latter capacity should advise the client
on the basis of "what the ultimate decisions of the courts would likely be as to the applicable law."
Id.
71. Id. EC 7-7. See note 124 and accompanying text infra (discussion of whether a criminal defendant has an absolute right to testify, irrespective of the advice of his attorney).
72. ABA CODnE,
EC 7-26. EC 7-26 provides:
The law and Disciplinary Rules prohibit the use of fraudulent, false, or perjured testimony or
evidence. A lawyer who knowingly participates in introduction of such testimony or evidence is
subject to discipline. A lawyer should, however, present any admissible evidence his client desires to have presented unless he knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that
such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or perjured.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. DR 7-102(A)(4). The disciplinary rule provides that "[in his representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not . . . [k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence." Id.
74. Id. DR 7-102(A)(6). The disciplinary rule provides that "[i]n his representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not ... [plarticipate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is
obvious that the evidence is false." Id.
75. Id. DR 7-102(A)(7). The disciplinary rule provides that "[i]n his representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not . . . [clounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent." Id.
76. DR 7-102(B)(1) was amended by the ABA House of Delegates, effective March 1, 1974.
ABA CODE BY STATE, supra note 52, CANON 7, at 17. See note 77 infra (full text of amended DR
7-102(B)(1)). See ABA COMM, ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975) (detailed history
of the evolution of DR 7-102(B)(1)).
Washington has not adopted the ABA's amendment of DR 7-102(B)(1). WASH. CODE, supra note
52, DR 7-102(B)(1), reproduced in note 77 infra.
77. The amended ABA version of DR 7-102(B)(1) provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that ... [h]is client has, in the course
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leaves much room for attorney discretion: The fraud must be "clearly
78
establish[ed]" and must occur in "the course of the representation."
Although the amendment merely resolves past client perjury in favor of
attorney silence, 79 and thus parallels the attorney-client privilege, 80 its
adoption by only eight states within three years after its promulgation by
the ABA 81 indicates its controversial nature.
of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud
to the affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected asa privileged communication.
ABA CODE, DR 7-102(B)(1) (emphasis indicating 1974 amendatory language added). See also note
79 infra.
Washington's version of DR 7-102(B)(1) is significantly different. In addition to making the attorney's revelation to an affected person merely permissive, the Washington disciplinary rule does not
contain the 1974 ABA amendment. Specifically, DR 7-102(B)(1) in Washington provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that ...[h]is
client has, in the course
of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal thefraud
to the affected tribunal and may reveal the fraud to the affected person.
WASH. CODE, supra note 52, DR 7-102(B)(1). Consequently, it appears that the Washington Supreme Court would require attorney revelation of client perjury committed during trial.
78. ABA CODE, DR 7-102(B)(I), reproduced in note 77 supra.
79. Prior to the amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1), see notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra, an
attorney was faced with contradictory duties under the ABA Code-both to maintain the
confidentiality of "privileged communications" and to reveal them. ABA CoMMi. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETmICS, OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975). Washington, by not adopting the amendment, see notes 76-77
supra, retains the contradiction.
ABA Opinion 341, in language that is cautious and confusing, acknowledges that "there has long
been an accommodation in favor of preserving confidences either through practice or interpretation"
and concludes that "It]he tradition ...that permits a lawyer to assure a client that information...
given to him will not be revealed to third parties is so important that it should take precedence, in all
but the most serious cases, over the duty imposed by DR 7-102(B)." The "most serious cases" are
not defined by the opinion and, as with the rule itself, the ambiguous terminology leaves much room
for attorney discretion.
The opinion does elaborate on the "privileged communication" language of DR 7-102(B)(1),
stating that "[t]he balancing of the lawyer's duty to preserve confidences and to reveal frauds is best
made by interpreting the phrase 'privileged communication' in the 1974 amendment to DR 7-102(B)
as referring to those confidences and secrets that are required to be preserved by DR 4-101." Opinion 341 rejects a common law definition of the "privileged communication" language of DR
7-102(B)(1) as "undesirable because the lawyer's ethical duty would depend upon the rules of evidence in a particular jurisdiction." See ABA DaENsE STANDARDS, supra note 5, Commentary to §
7.7(c), at 18 ("It should be noted that DR 7-102(B), which requires a lawyer to reveal a 'fraud'
perpetrated by his client on a tribunal, is construed as not embracing the giving of false testimony in a
criminal case."). See also M. FREDMAN, LAwYERs' ETICS INANADVERSARY SYSTEa 29 (1975) (reading the above Commentary to imply that, even in those jurisdictions not adopting DR 7-102(B)(1) as
amended, the provision does not apply to criminal defense attorneys); Wolfram, supra note 52, at
837 n. 105 ("Opinion 341 is the latest in a bewildering series of opinions of the ABA ethics committee dealing with disclosure of client perjury .... The opinions give an array of inconsistent options
and rarely cite each other or note the increasing confusion."). See also note 139 infra.
80. See notes 42-45 supra.
81. ABA CODE BY STATE, supra note 52, CANON 7, at 17.
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The ABA StandardsRelating to the Defense Function

The ABA Defense Standards 82 concede the uncertainty of professional
standards in criminal defense work 83 and explicitly address the duties of a
criminal lawyer whose client commits perjury. 84 In obtaining informa85
tion, the attorney is advised to encourage her client to disclose fully;
indeed, it is unprofessional conduct under the Defense Standards for the
attorney to suggest that the client be less than candid. 86 Generally, an attorney may reveal a client's intention to commit a crime, 87 but must do so
if she believes that her revelation is necessary to prevent a contemplated
crime that would seriously endanger life or personal safety or would cor88
rupt court processes.

82. The ABA's Advisory Committee on the Prosecution and Defense Functions, chaired until
mid-1969 by then United States Circuit Judge Warren E. Burger of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals, worked on the standards from 1964 to 1971. The committee's report on the defense
function was circulated in tentative draft form in March 1970. The draft was approved, with amendments dated March 1971, by the ABA House of Delegates in February 1971. ABA PROJECTON STANDARDSFORCRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMPILA.

TION, 481-82 app. (1974). In August 1977 the Standing Committee on Association Standards for
Criminal Justice was authorized to update the Defense Standards. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON
ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMIIrEE ON ASSOCIATION

STANDARDS FORCRIMINAL JUSTICE 27 app. (February 1979) [hereinafter cited as FEBRUARY 1979 STANDINGCOMMITrE REPORT] (on file with Washington Law Review). The Prosecution and Defense Func-

tion Standards were finally adopted, with some revisions, by the ABA House of Delegates at its
February 1979 meeting. ABA DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS, SUMMARY OF ACTION oF HOUSE OFDELGrATES
AT FEBRUARY 1979 MEETING 4 (1979) (on file with Washington Law Review). See note 89 and

accompanying text infra (discussion of the special history of ABA Defense Standard § 7.7).
The ABA Defense Standards are designed to supplement and to be compatible with the ABA
Code. Wolfram, supra note 52, at 824. They are, however, merely advisory and do not have the
force either of law or of the ABA Code when adopted by statute or by court rule. Bazelon, supra note
21, at 17. In contrast to the ABA Code, the Defense Standards attempt to distinguish clearly between
regulatory minimums and standard practice. Sutton, supra note 15, at 505. See also note 51 supra.
They employ the term "unprofessional" to signify conduct that should result in disciplinary action.
ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 1.1(f), at 10.
83. "[A] large obstacle to making criminal defense work more attractive as a career is the ambiguity of the defense lawyer's role [and] the uncertainty surrounding the standards of professional conduct applicable to its performance.

... ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, Introduction, at

143.
84. With respect to perjury by witnesses other than his accused client, "[ilt is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer knowingly to offer false evidence... by ... testimony of witnesses, or fail to seek
withdrawal therefrom upon discovery of its falsity." Id. § 7.5(a), at 16 (emphasis omitted). See also
ABA CODE, DR 7-102(B)(2) (an attorney discovering fraud on a tribunal by one other than his client
must promptly report the fraud to the tribunal).
85. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 3.1(a), at 157.
86. Id. § 3.2(b), at 158. The standard discourages the attorney from simply counseling the client
to withhold evidence of guilt from him in order to avoid the attorney's duty to disclose. This practice,
envisioned by Freedman, supra note 17, at 1472, is discussed in more detail in Part III-B-I infra.
87. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 3.7(d), at 160. An exception to the rule was
provided by ABA Defense Standard § 7.7. See notes 89-97 and accompanying text infra.
88. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 3.7(d), at 160. A client's intention to bribe orco-
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Defense Standard § 7.7, effective from 1971 to 1979,89 suggested that
the criminal defense attorney respond to client perjury with "passive
erce a juror or witness is illustrative of "corrupting court processes." Id. Commentary to § 3.7, at
222.
89. The Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice was commissioned in
August 1977 by the ABA House of Delegates to revise all 18 volumes of the criminal justice standards. FEBRUARY 1979 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supranote 82, at 27 app. The Committee recommended to the House of Delegates in February 1979 that the following "stylistic and minor clarifying
changes," id. at 25, be made to Standard § 7.7:
(a) If the defendant has admitted to his lawyer facts which establish guilt and the lawyer's
independent investigation establishesd that the admissions are true but the defendant insists on
his right to trial, the lawyer must advise strongly discouragehis client against taking the witness
stand to testify -falsely perjuriously.
(b) If, .beform in advance of trial, the defendant insists that he will take the stand to testify
falselyperjuriously, the lawyer.must may withdraw from the case, if that is feasible, seeking
leave of the court if necessary:, but the court should not be advised of the lawyer's reasonfor
seeking to do so.
(c) If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by the court, or if the situation arises immediately preceding trial or during the trial and the defendant insists upon
testifying .falsely perjuriously in his own behalf, it is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to
lend his aid to the perjury or use the perjured testimony. Before the defendant takes the stand in
these circumstances, the lawyer should make a record of the fact that the defendant is taking the
stand against the advice of counsel in some appropriate manner without revealing the fact to the
court. The lawyer must-confinehisexaminationto. may identifying.the witness as the defendant
and pernitting-himtomrake-his-statement-to-the.t-ieror-the-trirs.of he-fats; may ask appropriate questions of the defendant when it is believed that his answers will not be perjurious.As to
mattersfor which it is believed the defendant will offer perjurioustestimony, the lawyer may-not.
engage-in- should seek to avoid direct examination of the defendant as-a-witness in the conventional manner; instead, the lawyer should ask the defendant ifhe wishes to make any additional
statement concerningthe case to the trieror triersof thefacts. A lawyer and.may not later argue
the defendant's known false version of the facts to the jury as worthy of belief, and he may not
recite or rely upon the false testimony in his closing argument.
Id. at 26 (emphasis added to proposed changes; original language stricken). The proposed revisions
would have substantively affected § 7.7 by making permissive many of the novel aspects of the standard which previously had been mandatory. The Council of the Section of Criminal Justice proposed,
instead, the following revision of ABA Defense Function Standard § 7.7:
(a) If the defendant has admitted to his lawyer facts which establish guilt and the lawyer's
independent investigation establishes that the admissions are true but the defendant insists on his
right to trial, the lawyer must advise his client against taking the witness stand to testify falsely.
(b) If, before trial, the defendant insists that he will take the stand to testify falsely and his
right to testify in his own behalf is guaranteed by Constitution or statute, the lawyer must
continue to advise the defendant against taking the witness stand to testify falsely.
(c) During trial if the defendant insists that he will take the stand to testify falsely against the
advice of counsel and his right to testify in his own behalf is guaranteed by Constitution or statute, the lawyer shall treat his client's testimony as any other evidence.
Id. at 25.
At the February 1979 midyear meeting, however, the House of Delegates deferred the proposed
revision of § 7.7 and referred the issue of client perjury in criminal cases to the Kutak Commission,
which is rewriting the ABA Code. New CriminalStandardsDrop Update on Perjury, 65 A.B.A.J.
336, 336 (1979). See generally note 51 supra. "In the interim; the Association will have no policy on
the client perjury issue." Courtroom Cameras Squelched-Perjury Guideline Deferred, 6 CRiM.
Jusr. 2, 2 (1979). For indications of what policy will be, see note 143 infra.
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refusal to lend aid." 90 Standard § 7.7 presented a novel attempt to balance the competing interests of a client to testify falsely and of an attorney
91
to conduct himself ethically.
Acknowledging that the decision whether to testify rested ultimately
with the accused, 92 Standard § 7.7(b) required the attorney to withdraw
from representation, if feasible, when the defendant insisted before trial
that she would testify falsely. 93 If withdrawal was unfeasible, or if the
attorney first became aware at trial of his client's intent to commit perjury, Standard § 7.7(c) expressly prohibited the attorney's active participation in the client's perjury but did not require withdrawal. 94 Instead, he
was restricted under § 7.7(c) to identifying his client as the defendant and
95
allowing her to make a narrative statement to the court and the jury;
further, the attorney could not rely on the client's perjured testimony either in later or in closing argument. 96 The attorney was also advised to
97
record that the client was taking the stand against the advice of counsel.

90. See Part III-B-6 infra (discussion of the problems with the "passive refusal to lend aid"
approach).
91. The Commentary to Defense Standard § 7.7 noted that this novel solution offered "the most
reasonable accommodation of the competing demands of the lawyer's absolute obligation to refrain
from introducing or aiding presentation of false testimony, on the one hand, and the defendant's absolute right on the other hand to testify in his own behalf, however ill-advised that course." ABA
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, Commentary to § 7.7, at 275. The Commentary observed that "if
the trial judge is informed of the situation, the defendant may be unduly prejudiced . . . and the
lawyer may feel that he is caught in a dilemma between protecting himself ... and prejudicing his
client's case .... " Id. at 277.
92. Id. § 5.2(a)(iii), at 163. Whether a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to take the
witness stand in her own behalf is a question currently being considered by the federal courts. See
note 124 and accompanying text infra. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 52, at 848-49 n. 154.
93. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 7.7(b), at 167, reproduced in note 89 supra. The
knowledge required to trigger the attorney's duties under Standard § 7.7 was that "the defendant has
admitted to his lawyer facts which establish guilt and the lawyer's independent investigation establishes that the admissions are true." Id. § 7.7(a), at 167, reproduced in note 89 supra.
94. Id. § 7.7(c), at 17, reproduced in note 89 supra. See also note 160 infra (consideration of
what attorney conduct might constitute subornation of perjury).
95. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 7.7(c), at 17-18, reproduced in note 89 supra.
Defense Standard § 7.7 anticipated that the accused would be allowed to testify in a narrative fashion. Id., Commentary to § 7.7, at 276. The narrative form was criticized as unrealistic, e.g., M.
FREEDMAN, supra note 79, at 37, and as unconventional, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 52, at 827 ("This
'free narrative' arrangement appears to have been constructed by the ABA committee entirely out of
its own bolt of cloth. No judicial or regulatory authority was, or could have been, cited in support of
it.'").

96. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 7.7(c), at 17-18, reproduced in note 89supra.
97. Id. at 17, reproduced in note 89 supra. The accompanying Commentary recommended that
the lawyer make a record by having the defendant subscribe to a file notation, witnessed by asecond
attorney. Id., Commentary to § 7.7, at 277. Defense Standard § 5.2(c) elaborated that the attorney
should record the circumstances, his advice and reasons, and the conclusion reached in a manner that
protected the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship. Id. § 5.2(c), at 163.
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4.

The common law ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine

The development of a constitutional right to counsel, based on the sixth
amendment, 98 is of recent origin99 but of fundamental importance to the
rights of the accused. 100 The United States Supreme Court has suggested
that the right to counsel includes the right to effective counsel. 101 At the
present time, appellate courts apply several different standards to evaluate
the effectiveness of defense counsel's performance. 102 Traditionally, the
"farce and mockery of justice" standard was employed. 103 Under this
standard, representation was deemed ineffective only when the trial was
such a sham that it shocked the conscience of the court. 104 The majority
98. The sixth amendment provides in part that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
99. Prior to 1938, the sixth amendment was viewed as affording only a right to retain counsel. In
1938 the United States Supreme Court found the sixth amendment to grant the right to appointed
counsel in all federal criminal cases. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The past 15 years have
seen a great extension in the reach of the sixth amendment right to counsel. In the landmark case of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the right to counsel was found to be required for all
state felony proceedings. The Gideon Court characterized the right to counsel as "fundamental," id.
at 342, and set the stage for a series of decisions which granted the right to counsel at various stages
of criminal proceedings. Nine years after Gideon, the right to counsel was mandated in trials for any
offense, "whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony," for which the penalty involved the
loss of liberty. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). Subsequent cases have developed a
".critical stage" analysis to determine the necessity for representation by counsel in criminal proceedings. Under this analysis, the right to counsel now attaches at line-ups if the accused has been
charged, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), at interrogations, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), at preliminary hearings, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), at arraignments,
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), and at appeals granted as a matter of right, Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Neither presence nor effectiveness of counsel is mandated at "noncritical stages," however. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 551 F.2d 619, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1977)
(custody does not trigger right to counsel; claim of ineffective assistance without merit).
100. The centrality of the right to counsel has been articulated by Justice Schaefer of the Illinois
Supreme Court: "Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is
by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have." Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,70 HARv. L. R-v. 1, 8 (1956).
101. The ineffective assistance doctrine began with the Scottsboro Boys' case. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the Court held that assignment of counsel at a time and under
circumstances precluding effective aid violated the sixth amendment, applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 68-71. If the purpose of the right to
counsel is to ensure the adversary nature of the legal system, such a right must comprehend the effectiveness of counsel. Bazelon, supra note 21, at 1-2. This position has been recently recognized
by the United States Supreme Court. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (dictum)
("[I]f the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel ....").
102. A variety of standards for judging the ineffectiveness of criminal defense counsel exists in
part because of the uneven historical development of the constitutional right to counsel. See notes 99
& 101 supra. See also note 106 infra.
103. The farce and mockery standard was first enunciated by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889(1945).
104. Id. at 670.
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of courts have abandoned the farce and mockery standard, 105 adopting instead a broad range of more stringent requirements for criminal defense
attorneys.' 0 6 While the ineffective assistance doctrine has expanded the
rights of criminal defendants, it has added another dimension to the ethical problem of the criminal defense attorney confronted with client perjury. 107

Defense Counsel's Dilemma Under the TraditionalRules

B.

Each of the professional rules discussed above governs, to some
extent, the conduct of a criminal defense attorney. To indicate clearly his
dilemma when faced with a client who presents or intends to present perjured testimony, the alternative courses of conduct that he might follow
08
will be examined.
1. Selective ignorance
One alternative for a criminal defense attorney is to suggest at the first
interview that he does not want to know if his client is guilty. 109 By such
"selective ignorance ' ' l 0 the attorney avoids being confronted with the
potential duty to report later perjury, since he has no conflicting informaOakes, Lawyer and Judge: The Ethical Duty of Competency, in ANNUAL WARREN CONFER.
note 17, at 57, 64.
106. For instance, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which originated the farce
and mockery standard, see note 103 supra, adopted a standard of effectiveness that requires "reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as [the defendant's] diligent and conscientious advocate." United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit defines effectiveness as "the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which
normally prevails at the time and place." Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970)
(footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has announced more specific
standards for effectiveness of defense counsel, similar to those of the ABA Defense Standards. Coles
v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
107. See, e.g., note 122 infra (discussion of a case in which attorney's efforts to deal ethically
with client perjury resulted in an infringement on her client's right to counsel).
108. As one court has noted, the ethical responsibilities of a criminal defense attorney confronted
with client perjury "raise serious questions . . . which have not received an abundance of judicial
scrutiny." United States exrel. Smith v. Fogel, 403 F. Supp. 104, 106 (N.D. I11.1975). Inaddition,
the attorney-client privilege shrouds the attorney's resolution of his ethical dilemmas in secrecy. See
note 172 and accompanying text infra. Consequently, the analysis undertaken here of those alternatives pursued outside the courtroom is based on a synthesis of the rules of professional conduct and
the opinions of various commentators.
109. E.g., Freedman, supra note 17, at 1472. The alternative of counseling the client to lie,
either to the attorney himself or at trial, is so clearly beyond the realm of permissible conduct that it
will not be considered here. See, e.g., Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949, 953 (E.D. Va. 1959). See
also ABA CoDE, DR 7-102(A)(7), reproduced in note 75 supra.
110. Freedman, supra note 17, at 1472.
105.

ENCE, supra
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tion from which to infer its existence. This course of conduct, however,
presents serious problems since one role of defense counsel is that of zealous representative:III It is difficult to conceive of a zealous representative
who fails to anticipate weaknesses in the client's case due to a lack of full
disclosure."1 2 Such selective ignorance might also constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel"13 and has been condemned as unethical by the
ABA Defense Standards. 114
2.

Avoiding knowledge

To be presented with the dilemma of a client's perjury, the defense attorney must first "know" that the client's testimony is or will be perjured. 115 The ABA Code defines this required knowledge in both subjective and objective terms. 116 ABA Defense Standard § 7.7(b) also
contained a "double knowledge" 117 requirement: The attorney must have
learned facts from her client which established guilt and must have had
evidence from "independent investigation" to establish the truth of the
client's admissions before a duty to advise against taking the stand
arose. 118 An attorney may respond to such rules by asserting that she
never "knows for sure" that her client is guilty" t9 and, therefore, never
111. E.g., ABA CODE, CANON 4, reproducedin note 56 supra. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text supra (general discussion of this duty).
112. An attorney who remains selectively ignorant may be confronted at trial with substantial
weaknesses in his client's case that he could have countered had he been sufficiently well-prepared to
have anticipated them. Freedman, supra note 17, at 1472.
113. "It would seem required by minimal standards of attorney competence to conduct such investigation as is necessary to determine the extent to which cross-examination or impeachment of a
client's intended testimony would effectively rebut the testimony." Wolfram, supra note 52, at 843
n.126.
114. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, Commentary to § 3.2(b), at 205. See note 86
supra.
115. To trigger the prohibitions against perjury under the ABA Code, "knowledge" is consistently required of the attorney. See note 116 infra. -[A]n attorney may not volunteer a mere unsubstantiated opinion that his client's protestations of innocence are perjured." United States ex rel.
Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977) (counsel's reporting of her opinion to court
unwarranted).
116. "[Kinowingly" participating in the introduction of perjured testimony is prohibited. ABA
CODE, DR 7-102(A)(4), reproducedin note 73 supra.The introduction of testimony that the attorney
"should know" is perjurious is also prohibited. Id. EC 7-26, reproduced in note 72 supra. See
Thode, Canons6 and 7: The Lawyer-Client Relationship, 48 Tax. L. REv. 367, 370 (1970). See also
ABA CODE, DR 7-102(A)(6), reproducedin note 74 supra.
117. Wolfram, supra note 52, at 825 n.56.
118. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 7.7(a), at 167, reproducedin note 89 supra. The
Commentary to Defense Standard § 7.7 restated the double knowledge requirement contained in the
standard itself, but did not indicate the rationale for the requirement. Id., Commentary to § 7.7, at
276.
119. Freedman, supra note 17, at 1472.
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knows that her client is presenting perjured testimony.
3.

Remonstration

If the attorney does not follow the selective ignorance approach to client perjury and comes to "know" that his client intends to commit perjury, the commentators1 20 and various professional rulesl 2' are generally
agreed that he should attempt to dissuade his client from presenting the
perjured testimony. 122
In the criminal defense area, however, competing considerations render an attempt to dissuade a client from perjury problematic. A criminal
defendant's right to take the stand can be exercised against the advice of
counsel1 23 and may be absolute.124 A successful attempt to dissuade the

120. E.g., id. at 1478; Wolfram, supra note 52, at 846.
121. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 7.7(a), at 167, reproduced in note 89 supra. See
ABA CODE, DR 7-102(A)(7), reproduced in note 75 supra.
122. For example, the attorney should inform the client of the tactical disadvantages of perjury,
including the possibilities that the perjury will be exposed on cross-examination, Freedman, supra
note 17, at 1478, or by the passive refusal to lend aid that the attorney plans to employ to deal with
the perjury, Wolfram, supranote 52, at 850 n. 159; that perjury is against the law, id. at 846; and that
the attorney may be forced to cease representation or to report the intended perjury to the court, id. at
847.
An attorney can go too far, however, in her attempt to dissuade the defendant from presenting
perjured testimony. In United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977), subsequent to a trial court ruling on the issue, court-appointed counsel informed her client that the court
would permit her to withdraw, and that he would be forced to represent himself during the remainder
of the trial, if he insisted on taking the stand to testify in what she considered to be a perjurious
manner. The defendant consequently decided not to testify and the defense rested without presentation of any evidence. Id. at 117. The appellate court found the trial court's ruling ..
.put [the
defendant] to a Hobson's choice': decline to testify and lose the opportunity of conveying his version
of the facts to the jury, or take the stand and forego his fundamental right to be assisted by counsel."
It therefore concluded that the ruling was "an impermissible infringement upon the [defendant's statutory] right to testify and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Id. at 120.
123. E.g., ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 5.2(a)(iii), at 162-63. See Thornton v.
United States, 357 A.2d 429, 433 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976) (defendant allowed to
testify against advice of retained counsel).
124. Whether the right of a criminal defendant to testify in his own behalf has reached constitutional dimensions is a question currently being considered by the federal courts. E.g., United States
ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 118-19 (3d Cir. 1977) (review of cases considering "constitutional" right of criminal defendant to testify and discerning an "enlightened trend" in its favor).
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 61, § 42, at 84 n.48 ("Surely, today the right of an accused to testify
in his own behalf must be of constitutional dimension."). Several state supreme courts have construed their state constitutions to grant the criminal defendant a constitutional right to testify. United
States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d at 119 (cases collected). See ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS,
supra note 5, § 5.2(a)(iii), at 162-63 ("The decisions which are to be made by the accused after full
consultation with counsel [include] ...whether to testify in his own behalf."). See note 89 supra
(Section of Criminal Justice proposed revision to ABA Defense Standards § 7.7(b)-(c),
acknowledging possibility of constitutional or statutory right of criminal defendant to testify). See
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client from taking the stand therefore may be a form of "[p]rejudice or
damage" to the client prohibited by the ABA Code. 125 On the practical
level, an attempt to dissuade the client from presenting perjured
testimony, in compliance with the ethical rules, may result in the client's
27
seeking another attorney 126 with whom she may be less candid. 1
4.

Withdrawal

The criminal defense attorney can be confronted with ethical mandates
to withdraw either prior to or at trial. If the attorney becomes reasonably
certain prior to trial that her client will present perjured testimony, and
has been unable to dissuade the client from taking the stand, the attorney

generally Hammerman, A CriminalDefendant'sConstitutionalRight to Testify-The Implicationsof
United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 23 VILL. L. REv. 678 (1978). See also ABA DEFE.NSE STANDARDS,
supra, Commentary to § 7.7, at 275, 276.
If the defendant has a constitutional right to testify, then he must logically have a practical ability
to lie. But see Revised Code 'Enforceable,' supra note 51, at 1283 (comments of Richard Sinkfield, member of Kutak Commission). One commentator has suggested a compromise alternative
to this dilemma which would allow the defendant to testify and permit the attorney to tell the
fact-finder that the client's testimony is, to the best of his knowledge, "not . . . factually accurate." Wolfram, supra note 52, at 870. This "compromise" position, however, is too
compromising: If, indeed, there is a constitutional right to testify, this alternative would render that
right less meaningful and would also recreate the problems inherent in the disclosure alternative. See
Part 111-B-5 infra.
Historically, the common law disqualified interested persons, including the criminal defendant,
from testifying. By the end of the nineteenth century, this rule of incompetence had been abolished
by legislation in every state but Georgia. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 570 (1961); United
States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 118 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1977). See C. McCoRMICK,
supra, § 65, at 142 ("The disability had the specious justification of preventing self-interested perjury .... "). In response to the dilemma of client perjury, it has been suggested that criminal defendants be allowed to make statements to the fact-finder-similar to the common law procedure of
allocution-and that these statements-unlike allocution-be presented as evidence in the trial.
Frankel, supra note 25, at 1053-54; Wolfram, supra, at 851 n.162. In fact, courts may instruct the
jury to give testimony by an interested party only such weight as they find it deserves, C. McCoRMICK, supra, § 65, at 144, and juries may discount the credibility of testimony by a criminal defendant, Wolfram, supra, at 852.
125. ABA CODE, DR 7-I01(A)(3).
Two different prejudicial or damaging aspects are created by the dissuasion alternative. First, some
evidence indicates that the failure of a criminal defendant to testify at trial increases the likelihood of
conviction. Freedman, supra note 17, at 1475. Consequently, an attorney's successful effort to dissuade his client from testifying may result in a guilty verdict that would not otherwise have been
rendered. Second, the client may have confided her guilt to the attorney in response to his assurances
that her statements would remain confidential between them; his attempts to dissuade in response to
her confidences may leave the client believing that she has been harmed by the relationship. See note
143 infra (a possible response to this issue by the new ABA Code).
126. See also note 129 and accompanying text infra.
127. Freedman, supra note 17, at 1476. Obviously, such an outcome would result in presentation of the same perjured testimony. Id.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 55:211, 1979

may have a duty to withdraw from representation. 128 Again, as in the case
of "successful" remonstration that results in the client seeking another
attorney, the client may simply disclose less to the successor attorney and
present the same perjured testimony.' 29 Further, the successor attorney
may be alerted to the ethical problem in this situation by the first attorney's withdrawal. 130
A request to withdraw made at trial in response to surprise perjurious
testimony can constitute a clear announcement of client perjury, ' 3' resulting in a transfer of the ethical problem to the judge. 132 In addition, the

128. People v. Blye, 223 Cal. App. 2d 143, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235 (1965) (defense attorney
should request to withdraw when client plans to commit perjury); ABA COMM ONPROFESSIONAL Em.
Ics, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1318 (1975) (unsuccessful attempt to dissuade client triggers withdrawal
requirement when criminal defendant intends to commit perjury). See Wolfram, supra note 52, at
855. An attorney who is representing an indigent defendant, however, may risk more serious
prejudice to his client by withdrawal. Freedman, supra note 17, at 1476. See ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS,
supra note 5, Commentary to § 7.7, at 275-76 (private criminal lawyers can exercise more
control over the conduct of a case, and over client perjury, because of greater leverage than courtappointed or public defender counsel). See also ABA CODE, EC 2-29 (attorney's belief in guilt of
accused is insufficient reason to request withdrawal); ABA COMM. ONPROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS,

No. 90 (1932) (withdrawal from a case after becoming convinced of the client's guilt is unethical
unless the client was forewarned of the possibility). Also, when it is so close to the date of trial that
withdrawal by the attorney would present a serious hardship to the defense of the client, the attorney
may be precluded from withdrawal. Wolfram, supra, at 860.
129. In State v. Phelps, 24 Or. App. 329, 545 P.2d 901 (1976), for example, the first attorney
withdrew from the case after receiving assurances from the client that the perjured testimony would
not be presented at trial. The client retained another attorney and the perjured testimony was presented to defend the case successfully. Id. at 902. See Henderson v. State, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d
136, 142 (1970); Freedman, supra note 17, at 1476; Lefstein, supra note 41, at 689-90. Some commentators have also suggested that the client will shop for another attorney who would not refuse to
assist in the presentation of the perjured testimony. E.g., Wolfram, supra note 52, at 856.
130. Wolfram, supra note 52, at 856 n.181.
131. The case best illustrating this communicative effect of a request to withdraw is Lowery v.
Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978). In Lowery, the attorney moved to withdraw immediately
following his client's denial of shooting the deceased. Subsequent to the court's denial of counsel's
motion to withdraw, the attorney stated that he had no further questions for his client. In his brief
closing argument, counsel did not refer to his client's denial. Id. at 729. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals found the attorney's motion to withdraw, timed as it was and made to the judge in a bench
trial, to be an "unequivocal announcement," id. at 730, of the defendant's guilt to the fact-finder
which served to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, id. at 729-31.
132. Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976),
illustrates the confusion engendered in one trial judge by counsel's request to withdraw. When confronted with the Government's evidence against him immediately prior to trial for murder, the defendant changed his statement to one inconsistent with his original statement. At trial, retained defense
counsel requested a bench conference and moved to withdraw " 'for moral ethical reasons.' " Id. at
432. At the court's request for greater specificity, counsel explained his ethical dilemma and then
suggested that the court also certify the case to another judge. The court transferred the case to a
second judge to avoid the possibility that the attorney's disclosure would influence its sentencing
decision, but without ruling on the attorney's request to withdraw. The first judge had instructed the

Failure of Professional Conduct Rules
attorney may not be permitted to withdraw during trial, 133 or may be re34
quired to support her request to withdraw with a statement of reasons. 1
Further, such conduct on the part of the attorney may result in reversal on
grounds of deprivation of due process 135 or ineffective assistance of
36
counsel. 1
5.

Disclosure

The disclosure of the client's intent to commit perjury is perhaps the
most controversial alternative, 137 because attorney revelation of perjury is
usually also revelation of the client's admission that she is guilty of the

second judge not to inquire into counsel's reasons for requesting withdrawal so that, when counsel
renewed his motion to withdraw, the second judge denied it for lack of valid reasons. The trial proceeded with no dimunition of counsel's ethical dilemma. Id. See Freedman, supra note 17, at 1477.
Even when the trial judge is not the fact-finder, her sentencing decision may be influenced by the
possibility of client perjury signaled by the motion to withdraw. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supranote
5, Commentary to § 7.7, at 277. See Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d at 432.
133. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1978) (court-appointed defense counsel's
request to withdraw, made immediately following defendant's denial of shooting and with refusal to
state reasons, was denied); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 432 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1024 (1976) (retained counsel's first request to withdraw, accompanied by statement of reasons
for request, resulted in transfer to another judge; counsel's second request to withdraw, made without
statement of reasons, was denied). See State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976) (numerous motions by defendant and by defense counsel to allow withdrawal were denied; intended
perjury by defense witness); ABA DFE.NSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, Commentary to § 7.7, at 275
(attorney's request to withdraw may be refused because trial has begun or because the court declines
to allow it).
134. The court may require a statement of reasons in order to render an "informed decision" on
the attorney's motion to withdraw. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1978); Thornton
v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 434-35 & n.9 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976) (trial
court's failure to inquire into reasons for motion to withdraw was error, but did not require reversal
since counsel's assistance was effective). See ABA DEFENsE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 7.7(b) (proposed revision), reproducedin note 89 supra(suggesting change in standard to prohibit counsel from
supporting request to withdraw with statement of reasons).
135. E.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978) (motion to withdraw served
as announcement of client perjury; conviction reversed on due process grounds). See Freedman, supra note 17, at 1476-77.
136. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., specially
concurring) (ineffective assistance of counsel preferable to due process as basis for decision); Freedman, supranote 17, at 1477 (anticipating the Lowery decision). But see Thornton v. United States,
357 A.2d 429, 433-34 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976) (request to withdraw, made at
trial, not ineffective assistance; credibility of defendant's alibi testimony, however, "was shattered
by the later introduction of [his] prior inconsistent statements.").
137. E.g., Revised Code 'Enforceable,' supra note 51, at 1283; Sutton, supra note 15, at
500 n.9. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977) ("Whether
an attorney representing a defendant in a criminal case must, or indeed may, disclose his client's intentions to perjure himself is an extremely complex question .... ") (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 55:211, 1979

crime for which she is being tried.1 38 While attorneys may currently
40
forego the disclosure alternative 39 because of its attendant problems
and because the professional rules have made it permissive rather than
mandatory, 1 41 the new ABA Code1 42 might require disclosure of the crim43
inal defendant's intention to commit perjury.1

138. Intended client perjury in criminal cases is the cutting edge of the future versus past crime
distinction under the attorney-client privilege, see Part III-A-] supra, since its disclosure reveals
both the defendant's intent to commit a crime (the intended perjury) and the defendant's past commission of a crime (the original crime for which the defendant is being tried). See People v. Blye, 223
Cal. App. 2d 143, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231, 236 (1965) (client's absence from recorded meeting at which
his counsel disclosed client confidences, his belief in the client's guilt, and the client's intent to commit perjury was deprivation of fair trial). But cf. Henderson v. State, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136,
139, 141 (1970) (since details of attorney-client communications were not revealed, attorney's
disclosure of defendant's intention to commit perjury was not disclosure of confidential communications). Since the disclosure alternative involves an all-or-nothing choice for the attorney-disclosing
both the future and past client crimes or disclosing neither-it is at this point that the theoretical
distinction between past and future crimes breaks down.
139. The professional rules have offered justification for the attorney who elects to forego the
disclosure alternative. As discussed above, the ABA Code makes revelation of future crimes of a
client permissive, ABA CODE, DR 4-10I(C)(3), reproduced in note 65 supra, and ABA Defense
Standard § 7.7 was an attempt to prohibit the express revelation of a criminal defendant's perjury,
ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 5, § 7.7(c), at 17-18, reproduced in note 89 supra. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), reproduced in note 77 supra, as interpreted by ABA Opinion 341, see note
79 supra, is so confusing on the issue of revelation of past client perjury that it is "extremely unlikely
that the disclosure requirement would ever be activated." Wolfram, supra note 52, at 837.
Conjuring up real-life hypothetical situations in which the committee that drafted Formal
Opinion 341 would apply the disclosure requirement of DR 7-102(B)(1) has become something
of a law school parlor game. Given the very broad reach of the "secret" confidentiality requirement as stated in DR 4-101 (A), the starting point is that the attorney must learn the information
from a source other than the client and at a time before his representation of the client begins or
after it ends. In the final analysis the practical effect of Opinion 341 is nearly to emasculate the
affirmative disclosure duty stated in DR 7-102(B)(1).
Id. at 837 n.106.
140. See note 138 supra.
141.

See note 139 supra. But see ABA COMM. ONPROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No.

1314 (1975) (attorney must withdraw or report perjury to court if unsuccessful in dissuading client
from committing perjury).
142. See note 51 supra.
143. Revised Code 'Enforceable,' supra note 51, at 1283. While the Kutak Commission is not
releasing details of its proposed new code until circulation of a working draft in February 1980, one
"unofficial" report by Professor Monroe Freedman has indicated that it will require criminal defense
attorneys to give their clients Miranda-likewarnings that their confidential communications could be
revealed in the event of client perjury. Id. See also Lefstein, supra note 41, at 688. A rule to this
effect would fall into the truth-oriented model discussed in notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra. Professor Freedman properly argues against such a requirement because it would simply result in
the "intentional ignorance" alternative discussed earlier. Revised Code 'Enforceable,' supra, at
1283. See Part III-B-1 supra. Then, if the client presents the perjured testimony before the attorney
becomes aware that it is perjured, he need not disclose because it has become a past crime and is
therefore privileged. See ABA COMM ONPROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1314 (1975).
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6.

Passive refusal to lend aid

Although passive refusal to lend aid 144 to the client's perjury may avoid
46
the ABA Code's prohibitions against "participation in" 145 or "use" 1 of
perjured testimony and has been assumed by many lawyers to be within
the rules for professional conduct,147 the practice has been widely criticized 148 and is no longer officially sanctioned by the ABA. 149 Advocates
of the truth-oriented view have argued that an attorney conforming to Defense Standard § 7.7 must act in "almost every respect as if the witness
were telling the truth,"' 150 and that such conduct misleads the factfinder.' 5 ' On the other hand, advocates of the adversary-oriented view
have argued that conforming to the standard by neither engaging in traditional direct examination nor relying on the defendant's testimony in later
argument is as damaging as failing to argue the case to the jury 152 and
that, in fact, such conduct serves as a clear announcement of client perjury to the fact-finder. 153 In addition, passive refusal to lend aid to client
144. See Part Ill-A-3 supra.
145. ABA CODE, DR 7-102(A)(4), reproducedin note 73 supra; id. EC 7-26, reproduced in
note 72 supra.
146. Id. DR 7-102(A)(4), reproduced in note 73 supra.
147. Wolfram, supra note 52, at 817-18. See Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 437
n.14 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976) (praising the ABA Standards in general and ABA
Defense Standard § 7.7 in particular).
148. E.g., Freedman, supra note 17, at 1477; Wolfram, supra note 52, at 853.
149. See note 89 and accompanying text supra. The ABA Standing Committee on Association
Standards for Criminal Justice cited Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978), and Statev.
Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976), as the cases prompting the proposed revisions to
Defense Standard § 7.7. FEBRUARY 1979 STANDING CoMMarEE RmoRT, supra note 82, at 25. See note

89 supra(history and texts of the original version of Defense Standard § 7.7 and proposed revisions).
150. Wolfram, supra note 52, at 853.
151. id. (arguing for rule requiring disclosure of client perjury to the fact-finder). See also id. at
852 (conceding that the free narrative solution may be relatively harmless since defense testimony
perceived as incredible is frequently discounted by juries).
152. Freedman, supra note 17, at 1477.
153. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978), discussed in note 131 supra;
State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174, 180 (1976) (counsel's passive refusal to lend aid to
perjury by defense witness found to be denial of fair trial and warranted new trial); Freedman, supra
note 17, at 1477. See also Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949, 953 (E.D. Va. 1959) (attorney's failure
to argue provocation defense based on defendant's signed statement was as improper as telling the
jury that his client had lied; reversal on due process grounds). But see Thornton v. United States, 357
A.2d 429, 438 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976) (defense counsel's compliance withABA
Defense Standard § 7.7 not ineffective assistance when defendant's alibi was transparent and Government's case was strong). For a related discussion of the effect of a motion to withdraw on the trial
court's inferences of client perjury, see notes 131-32 supra.
Juries are certain that the attorney knows whether or not his client is guilty and are alert to any
conduct by him that is inconsistent with a belief in the client's innocence. Freedman, supra, at
1471-72. Both the recommendations that the attorney present his client's testimony in free narrative
form and that he avoid reference to the client's denial of guilt in his closing argument would seem to
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perjury might constitute abandonment of a diligent defense' 54 and ineffective assistance of counsel.155
7. Active aid
Several commentators, advocating an adversary-oriented view,
contend that the only appropriate course of conduct for criminal defense
counsel confronted with a perjurious client is to present the client's testimony without explicit or implicit disclosure of his knowledge to either
the judge or the jury. 156 The logic of this position is supported by the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship 57 and by the special constraints of the constitutional right to a fair trial and the doctrine of
ineffective assistance of counsel. 158 One major difficulty with the active
aid alternative, in addition to any moral objections that the individual atbe clear signals to the fact-finder, whether judge or jury, of client perjury. The trial court may initially be more alert to the meaning of the attorney's conduct but, if the practice became widespread,
juries would also become alert to its meaning. See Wolfram, supra note 52, at 849-50. See also
Lefstein, supra note 41, at 684 & n.83.
154. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., specially concurring); State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174, 180 (1976) (passive refusal to lend aid to
perjury of defense witness was denial of fair trial).
In one murder case, court-appointed defense counsel disbelieved the defendant's signed statement
describing the events surrounding the killing. Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
When the statement, which raised a provocation defense, was introduced by the prosecution at trial,
defense counsel's ethically prompted failure to argue that defense rendered the representation incompetent. Such conduct was "as improper as though the attorney had told the jury that his client had
uttered a falsehood in making the statement." Id. at 953. The Johns decision, which reversed the
defendant's conviction on due process grounds, id. at 954, did not present the issue of client perjury
at trial, since the defendant did not testify, id. at 952. Consequently, Johns falls into the class of less
controversial cases dealing with past, rather than future or continuing, crimes. See notes 61-62 and
accompanying text supra. See also note 138 supra.
155. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., specially concurring). See also Wolfram, supra note 52, at 849 n. 155. In United States ex rel. Smith v. Fogel, 403
F. Supp. 104 (N.D. I11.1975), defendant's allegation of trial counsel's incompetence, based in part
on a dispute between counsel and client on the substance of defendant's testimony, resulted in
remanding the case for a full evidentiary hearing. See also note 154 supra. But see Thornton v.
United States, 357 A.2d 429, 438 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976) (retained counsel's
compliance with ABA Defense Standard § 7.7 did not constitute ineffective assistance, given strong
prosecution evidence and defendant's transparent alibi).
156. E.g., Freedman, supra note 17, at 1477-78. Professor Freedman has supported his choice
of this active aid alternative in part by reference to survey data: Ninety percent of one Washington,
D.C. sample of attorneys, who responded anonymously, reported they would elect this alternative.
M. FREEDMAN, supra note 79, at 38 (citing Friedman, ProfessionalResponsibility in D.C.: A Survey,
1972 RS IPSA LoQuITUR 60, 81). See also Noonan, supra note 25, at 1486 ("Professor Freedman's
solutions seem plausible, if not mandatory; he has merely expressed as a norm what is, in fact, current practice for some practitioners.").
157. Freedman, supra note 17, at 1478.
158. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 79, at 34.
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torney may well have to the practice, 159 is that it may constitute suborna60
tion of perjury. 1
IV.

THE ALTERNATIVE OF SYSTEM-ORIENTED RULES
FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The preceding overview of the various professional rules of ethical
conduct' 6 l as applied to a criminal defense attorney confronted with client
perjury 162 indicates the problems inherent in a situation-oriented model of
professional responsibility. 163 The rules, based on two often competing
66
65
views of the lawyer's role, 164 are at times contradictory,1 ambiguous, 1
and do not anticipate all factual situations with which an attorney may be
confronted. 167 The difficulties with the various situation-oriented rules
are magnified greatly in the case of the criminal defense attorney1 68-perhaps because of the unique capacity that he serves in the adversary system 169 -but are representative of other contexts and capacities as well.
159. This comment is concerned only with professional standards for ethical conduct; individual,
personal ethics, while undoubtedly exerting a major influence on attorney conduct, are not subject to
systematic analysis and are outside its scope. But see Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949, 953 (E.D.
Va. 1959) (professional conduct based on personal conscience can result in incompetent defense),
discussed in note 154 supra.
160. Some commentators have argued that active aid is not subornation of perjury, e.g., Freedman, supranote 17, at 1478, while others are less certain, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 52, at 816-17
n.23. Whether the active aid alternative constitutes subornation may be a trivial question, since the
risks that an attorney will be criminally prosecuted are "not great." Id. at 816. See also Bronston v.
United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358-60 (1973) (federal perjury statute should not be loosely construed,
since such construction would discourage witnesses from appearing and since the burden is on the
questioner to expose perjury through cross-examination). Obviously, the risks of subornation for the
attorney will vary with the statutory definitions and decisional law within his jurisdiction.
161. See Part III-A supra.
162. See Part Ill-B supra.
163. For a general discussion of the situation-oriented model of professional responsibility and
its inherent problems, see notes 7-13 and accompanying text supra.
164. See notes 23-33 and accompanying text supra (brief discussion of the two competing
views).
165. Aronson, supra note 7, at 274.
166. Id.; Wolfram, supra note 52, at 870.
167. Wolfram, supra note 52, at 870. "The problem is that the infinitude of facts tends to limit
the usefulness of precedent, and inevitably sound legal reasoning requires a return to principles and
the justifications for them, which is the point we are approaching with legal ethics." Patterson, A
PreliminaryRationalizationof the Law of Legal Ethics, 57 N.C. L. REv. 519, 527 (1979). As one
commentator has observed, "[i]n what is probably a confession of seriously divided opinion, rather
than a refusal to recognize the existence of the problem, the formal regulations of the legal profession
speak in barely detectable whispers about perjury and are entirely silent about many common problems." Wolfram, supra, at 811.
168. E.g., Fruits of the Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 40, at 240.
169. The unique capacity served by the criminal defense attorney involves a more delicate balancing of the "officer of the court" and "zealous representative of the client" views than does any
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One of the consequences of the ambiguous rules that purport to guide
attorneys' conduct is that much of the responsibility for determining appropriate professional behavior is placed on the attorney herself. 170 In the
particular situation analyzed above, for instance, the attorney alone is
afforded the privilege of confidential communications with the client and
has the best opportunity to know of client perjury. 171 The protected nature
of the relationship, however, also serves to keep the ethical propriety or
impropriety of the attorney's conduct invisible 72 and it is therefore difficult to know how individual attorneys are resolving the issue of client perjury. 173 That professional rulemakers frequently leave enormous discretion to the individual attorney is antithetical to rulemaking itself: 174 If the
purpose of professional rules of conduct is to control that conduct, the
first task must be to formulate a set of clear, consistent, and
75
comprehensive rules. 1

Several commentators have previously recognized that appropriate sys-

other attorney capacity. For example, the prosecutor's obligations to the truth and to the court appear
much more clearly to fall within the "truth-oriented" view. See note 24 and text accompanying notes
24-27 supra. The special protections afforded to the criminal defense attorney's client contribute to
the uniqueness of his capacity. See notes 31 & 40 supra. No other attorney in the legal system, for
example, is subject to scrutiny for ineffective assistance of counsel. Whatever the cause, the professional debate about the appropriate conduct of a lawyer whose client is committing perjury becomes
particularly heated when that client is a criminal defendant.
170. "Just as the decisionmaker might seek to escape responsibility by applying formal rules, the
rulemaker might seek to escape responsibility by promulgating nonformal standards that place discretion and responsibility on the shoulders of the decisionmaker." Powers, supra note 8, at 29-30 n. 14.
See also Aronson, supra note 7, at 320.
171. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 17, at 1476.
172. For example, it would be difficult for someone outside the attorney-client relationship to
detect an attorney who is selectively ignorant of, or who refuses to "know" about, or who actively
aids in, client perjury. See generally Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to Report Other
Lawyers' Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95, 98; Comment,
The Imposition of DisciplinaryMeasuresfor the Misconduct ofAttorneys, 52 CourNs. L. REV. 1039,
1042 (1952). See also note 156 supra.
173. But see note 156 supra (one source of data on how attorneys are resolving this issue).
174. One commentator, for example, has observed that:
[t]he paradox is that to give the lawyer discretion to be ethical through the medium of ethics is
also to give him the discretion to be unethical. Thus, unless we correlate rules of ethical and
legal conduct for the lawyer, the result will often be less than either ....
• . .[T]he price of a separate body of ethical rules is both opportunity for the cynical and
confusion for the conscientious lawyer. To command with one rule what is merely commended
by another frequently gives a choice, whether intended or not, and the effect is to detract from
the efficacy of the legal rule. The advantage goes to the unethical lawyer, since the ambiguity
created thereby gives an opportunity to apply the ethical or legal rule as expedience dictates.
Patterson, supra note 167, at 522-23 (footnotes omitted) (discussing ABA Code, DR 4-101(C) in
conjunction with ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 341 (1975)).
175. See generally Aronson, supra note 7, at 319.
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tern-oriented rules of conduct for attorneys in one capacity might differ
from those for attorneys in other capacities. 176 In the context of the special protections surrounding an accused in a criminal case, 177 for example, the current situation-oriented ethical rules for her attorney-some of
which favor adherence to the "lawyer as an officer of the court" rolefrequently conflict with other legal protections afforded to the client. A
system-oriented model would provide a coherent guiding principle that
could be applied to all conduct of an attorney acting in a given capacity.
Adoption of an adversary-oriented set of ethical rules for criminal defense
attorneys, for example, would avoid the conflict by recognizing that
representation of a criminal defendant justifies certain attorney conduct as
"ethical" that would not be so in other situations. If an adversary-oriented alternative was adopted, the profession could "stop treating criminal defense attorneys as somewhat soiled and instead develop rules which
not only permit but demand that all conduct'be consistent with a belief in
the innocence of an accused." 178 Alternatively, application of a truth-oriented view to the role of criminal defense attorneys would require
constriction of the attorney-client privilege 7 9 and of the available courses
of conduct justifiable in the name of zealous representation.
While both adversary- and truth-oriented views provide valid bases for
formulating a system-oriented set of ethical rules, theii coexistence in a
situation-oriented model has been anything but peaceful. The attempt to
balance the two competing views within the current situation-oriented
model has led to professional conduct rules that fail to guide attorneys in
all but the simplest cases. A system-oriented model-by selecting at the
outset one view to be systematically applied to all attorneys acting in a
certain capacity-would present the attorney with a guiding principle
against which he could measure his professional conduct and against
which the profession could reasonably hold him accountable. Until such a
model is adopted, neither is possible.

176. E.g., id.; Fruitsof the Attorney-Client Privilege, supranote 40, at 243 (suggesting separate
rules for criminal attorneys are essential). See Sutton, supra note 15, at 513 ("The second method
likely to be considered [in selecting a format for the new ABA Code] is one that subdivides the pro.
fessional code according to the various roles a lawyer performs ....
177. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
178. Aronson, supra note 7, at 319. Under this model, "[a]n attorney who reveals confidences
because of a perceived duty to the court . . . will be deemed to have acted unethically." Id. Cf.
Wolfram, supra note 52, at 840 n. 114 (The special protections surrounding a criminal defendant
should not be used to justify a "battlefield ethics" that sanctions client perjury.).
179. Aronson, supra note 7, at 319.

V.

CONCLUSION

As exemplified by the situation in which a criminal defense attorney is
confronted with a perjurious client, the various rules for professional conduct are found in several sources, are often inconsistent, are frequently
ambiguous, do not anticipate all potential sets of facts, and generally do
not provide much guidance for the attorney who is attempting to act ethically. Rather than defining ethical courses of conduct, the professional
rules frequently add confusion to already confused areas of professional
responsibility. Because any systematic effort to enforce rules of conduct
through professional discipline depends on the clarity and comprehensiveness of the rules themselves, the first task of the professional rulemakers must be to formulate a system-oriented set of rules. The professional debates over controversial ethical situations, such as perjury of a
criminal defendant, will likely continue until the legal system as a whole
is willing to abandon its situation-oriented professional rules for those
that are system-oriented.
Since the very nature of discrete rules to guide conduct ensures that all
factual situations will not be anticipated, attorneys must also be provided
with system-oriented principles to follow in their absence. The current
professional rules, by embodying two often contradictory views of the attorney's role, provide the least guidance in the most difficult ethical situations. Unless the attorney is given a guiding principle that can be systematically applied, both by the professional rulemakers in the formulation
of conduct rules and by herself in the absence of such conduct rules, her
role in the legal system will continue to be confused and confusing.
Joni Hammersla Ostergaard
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